Putin's recent attitude towards neighboring Ukraine has already resulted in the relaunch of NATO as a more "assertive" organization. Is it possible that the belligerent Russian paterfamilias is burning with the desire to get into trouble alone? According to all our media (rather two-dimensional and one-way), it would seem so.
I will pretend that it is, even if in these observations a few weeks ago I considered an armed conflict difficult (leaning more towards a cyberwar).
Why is Putin making so many mistakes?
Let's analyze the situation from a historical perspective. Everyone expected that at the end of the Cold War (and the Soviet Union) a scenario of international development and cooperation would prevail.
Globalization has made nations more interdependent on crucial issues: finance, trade, cultural exchanges. Yet the attacks certainly did not stop in 1991: in fact, already in August 1990, the First Gulf War. We would gradually witness the war in Yugoslavia, the first War in Chechnya, the second Gulf War and above all the long period of "war on terror", which to some extent continues today.
Not only Putin, therefore: but we cannot pretend that his presence did not have a certain coherence of action. In the general chaos between the 90s and 2000s, in fact, the Russian President himself showed that he had the intention not to lose ground and not to support a further "peaceful disintegration". This is demonstrated by the Second Chechen War of 1999, conducted in line (or rather, more so) with Yeltsin's strategies of 5 years earlier.
What has changed since then? One might say "nothing".
Nobody can seriously be surprised at what is happening in Ukraine. Putin has always exercised a "centrifugal" push towards the republics that were previously part of the Soviet bloc, and on the other hand the United States has always tried to "wrest" as many as possible from that sphere of influence.
Russians themselves, who for the most part do not regret communism at all, agree that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a great tragedy. The loss of military, social and political power worries the Russians more than anything else, and has pushed them to trust Putin more and more: those who believe that his presence is guaranteed only by his ferocity in defending his positions are wrong. of power.
In 2014, Putin's leadership “reputation” further grew after the de facto incorporation of Crimea into the Russian federation. A very popular move in Russia, which probably also dramatically increased his self-esteem.
How many? Enough to make him acquire a strategic clarity out of the ordinary? Or to make him make a desperate and dead-end move?
Ukraine, Nasha zemlya
The Russians have long been very concerned that Ukraine's inclusion in NATO would be a great risk to national interests. Ironically, one of the reasons why Ukraine is not yet a member of NATO is because in the Atlantic pact they were afraid to bring such an unreliable and politically unstable country into the fold. A picture that could change over time: and which Putin probably sees as "inevitable" in the medium term.
He's right. NATO wants to expand to the East, it is an equally clear trend, only the Western media omit it to paint a one-way picture. And Russian citizens, even before Putin, see this expansion not only as a threat, but as a betrayal.
Why? Because in the 1989 negotiations that led to the end of the Cold War, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany, and the unification of Germany in 1990, the Russians received assurances that NATO forces would advance no further east.
Of course, there were no discussions at the time to extend NATO to former Warsaw Pact nations or even former Soviet republics, because the Soviet Union had not yet dissolved and remained in control of most of those regions. The situation changed quite dramatically already two years later. Those guarantees, however, were regarded by Russian elites as a promise.
And the maneuvers to "reconquer" Ukraine, perceived as Nasha Zemlya, ("our land"), the compensation for this betrayed promise. Starting from Crimea.
The first act may have been just that
After independence, Ukraine experienced alternating pro-Russian and anti-Russian electoral majorities for the next three decades. When the anti-Moscow movement organized itself (perhaps with some help from abroad), Russia feared that it would no longer have political options to "win" the elections in Ukraine and manage "close" cooperation between the two nations.
The growth (perhaps with some help, even here) of separatist movements in the provinces on the border between Ukraine and Russia and the subsequent civil war they were a consequence of this fear, and at the same time the pretext for Putin, with which to exert pressure and obtain concessions. Until today.
Why is Putin threatening Ukraine now?
This is the crux of the whole issue, in my opinion. And it's no coincidence that it's the question everyone is asking. Once again, is his action cause or consequence? Putin has assessed the US withdrawal from Afghanistan as a sign of weakness (combined with Biden's objectively weak leadership) and wants to take advantage of it for a coup, or fears that this very weakness on the Eastern front will translate into a "relaunch of the encirclement NATO” (let's say USA first) around Russia?
We do not yet know. What we record, however, is that the feared Russian invasion has been waved as imminent for weeks by media that seem to be waiting for nothing else, primed by a strategic direction. Emblematic the Bloomberg case who a few days ago "by mistake" posted the non-existent news of an invasion, complete with a report of the operations.
Why does the USA have this "crazy desire" for a Russian invasion? Do they also provoke to bluff, or can't they wait for it to happen?
Who would the invasion of Ukraine hurt the most?
I would like to try to answer this question, but two things need to be said.
First: Putin on his side, if he wanted to invade Ukraine, has at least a couple of options. The first is to occupy the entire country and (perhaps) incorporate it into the Russian Federation. The second is to expand the territory under Russian control: for example, occupying only the coastal region in the south, expanding the currently occupied area. They are territories occupied by people who mostly speak Russian, and consider themselves Russian. Little effort to control it, another blow to self-esteem. A necessary self-esteem, because the decline of his "actions" among the Russian people could represent the second, definitive dissolution of a bloc. At least for Putin's supporters.
Second: Russia undoubtedly has all the ability to invade Ukraine. She can blindly defeat the Ukrainian army, which lacks the necessary air defense capability. However, a long-term occupation of Ukraine could be a bloodbath: it is difficult for Russia to "pacify" Ukraine and counteract long-term "active resistance". The cost of an invasion, and here I answer the question, would be enormous.
Invading Ukraine, in my opinion, would harm Russia much, much more.
This is why the US wants nothing else.
Once again the "ideal" scenario for reaffirming one's power, this time with greater involvement of European nations too. As was the case in the aftermath of 11/XNUMX, the US has an opportunity to further militarize NATO and further encircle Russia.
In the event of an attack, economic sanctions imposed by NATO allies would put a stranglehold on Russia's economy, collapse its banking system, cause the ruble to lose much of its value and cause Russians' living standards to plummet. Who benefits?
